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1. Introduction 
 
The gap between the observable and the actual has for long been the anathema of social 
scientists. Over the years this has led to the conceptualization of the ‘hidden economy’.  
Black, shadow, underground, unobserved, unofficial, subterranean, unrecorded, informal, 
irregular, second, twilight, parallel - synonyms used for the ‘hidden economy’ seem to 
highlight the fact that this concept, which essentially captures the activities beyond 
measurement by fiscal or economic factors, is itself replete with differences in definitions 
and pathologies.
1 The hidden economy basically consists of legal and illegal activities 
outside the reach of the government.
2 Studies show that underground activities have been 
on the rise since the ‘70s when the presence of government activity became stronger in 
the economies around the world. With increase in tax rates to finance larger public 
spending programs, the desire to escape taxes and regulatory restrictions also gained in 
prominence (Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997)).  To quote Tanzi (1999) “Thus a good case 
could be made that what came to be called as the underground economy was a 
phenomenon to worry about.  Newspaper articles were ready to accept the notion that the 
underground economy had increased significantly over the years, thus casting doubts on 
the accuracy of the official economic statistics and raising the prospect that large 
increases in tax revenue were possible, if only the underground could be taxed”. Such 
media attention brought the nexus of the black economy into the public glare creating a 
consciousness about the gravity of the phenomenon all over the world. Such a role of the 
media is something we shall discuss in section 5 of this paper. The remnant parts of the 
paper are organized in the following manner. The next section i.e. Section 2 gives a 
synoptic view of the previous literature. Sections 3 and 4 dwell on the methodology of 
the paper in detail. Section 5 is divided in to four subsections. The first subsection lists 
                                                 
1) Compare e.g. in the Economic Journal, vol. 109, no. 456, June 1999 the feature “controversy: 
on the hidden economy”. 
2) The literature about the “shadow”, “underground”, “informal”, “second”, “cash” or “parallel”, 
economy is increasing. Various topics, on how to measure it, its causes, and its effect on the 
official economy are analyzed. See for example, survey type publications by Frey and 
Pommerehne (1984); Thomas (1992); Loayza (1996); Pozo (1996); Lippert and Walker (1997); 
Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1998); Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), and Johnson, 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a); and for an overall survey of the global evidence of its 
size in terms of value added Schneider and Enste (2000). 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  3 
out the basic data variables used in the analysis, the second one tests for the presence of 
unit roots, the third one documents the nature of the hidden economy estimates obtained 
by the MIMIC methodology, and the fourth deals with the rate of political and 
institutional factors. Section 6 deals with an international comparison of the shadow 
economy of other Asian countries and in section 7 a summary and a policy conclusion are 
given. 
 
2. A short Review of the Literature of the Indian Shadow Economy 
 
The presence of the black economy in India first came to the forefront with the release of 
the Wanchoo Committee Report (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 1971, p.6), 
that referred to the phenomenon as a “cancerous growth in the country’s economy which 
if not checked in time, will surely lead to it’s ruination”.  The Venkatappiah Committee 
Report (Government of India, 1974), which focussed on the self-removal of excise taxes 
also felt “free to confess that we are not prepared for, and are, therefore, painfully 
surprised at, the range, diversity and, in certain segments of production, almost the 
universality of the evasion which is practiced by those who produce the goods”.  Besides 
taxes, the extent of regulation rampant in the economy encouraging the proliferation of 
the hidden economy was highlighted way back in 1979 (Government of India, Ministry 
of Finance, 1979) by the Dagli Committee Report. This report documents the web of 
regulation that seems to have stifled industrial licensing, import licensing, controls on 
prices and distribution channels of goods and services, credit controls and other measures 
in India for some decades now. Given the particulars it might not be too surprising to 
comment that capturing the size of the hidden economy might also help in ascertaining 
the amount of corruption and inefficiency in the system to a certain extent.  
 
3. The Definition of the Shadow/Hidden Economy: An Attempt 
 
Now how do we define the hidden economy? Experts have realized over the years that, 
trying to arrive at a solitary definition of the underground or hidden economy is a 
mammoth if not an irrational and inhibiting exercise. A better option would be to identify 
and list the major definitions, causes, characteristics and also techniques for the 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  4 
measurement of the hidden or shadow economy in literature. Vito Tanzi (1999), 
acknowledged for his work on the US hidden economy in the early ‘80s, suggests that the 
shadow economy crops up because of presence of activities that are difficult to measure 
and tax, like household work and also criminal and illegal activities. Schneider (1986) 
sums this point succinctly by defining the underground economy as “all economic 
activities that contribute to the value added and should be included in national income in 
terms of national accounting conventions but are presently not registered by national 
measurement agencies”. Bhattacharyya (1999) describes the hidden economy as reflected 
by the unrecorded national income “calculated as the difference between the potential 
national income for the given currency in circulation and the recorded national income”. 
Bagawacha and Naho (1995) consider it as a combination of informal (small-scale 
production and distribution units), parallel (illegal production of legal activities) and 
black market activities (production and distribution of market and non-market goods 
forbidden by the government). Acharya (1985) in the Indian context refers to the black 
economy as “the aggregate of incomes which are taxable but are not reported to the tax 
authorities” and also “the extent to which estimates of national income and output are 
biased downwards because of deliberate, false reporting of incomes, output and 
transactions for reasons of tax evasion, flouting of other economic controls and related 
motives”. From the above discussion it can be inferred that the shadow or hidden 
economy deals with the portion of the income earned from legal and illegal activities that 
cannot be accounted for by the standard measurement procedures used in compilation of 
national income accounts. This can be taken as a relatively broad definition of the 
‘underground economy’.  
 
Hence, a commonly used working definition is: all currently unregistered economic 
activities, which contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National 
Product.
3) Smith (1985, p. 18) defines it as “market-based production of goods and 
services, whether legal or illegal that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP.“ 
As these definitions still leave open a lot of questions, table 1 may be helpful for 
                                                 
3) This definition is used for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a), Frey and 
Pommerehne (1984), and Lubell (1991). 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  5 
developing a better feeling for what could be a reasonable consensus definition of the 
legal and illegal underground or shadow economy. 
 
From table 1 it becomes clear that the shadow economy includes unreported income from 
the production of legal goods and services either from monetary or barter transactions - 
hence all economic activities which would generally be taxable were they reported to the 
state (tax) authorities. In general, a precise definition seems quite difficult, if not 
impossible as „the shadow economy develops all the time according to the 'principle of 
running water': it adjusts to changes in taxes, to sanctions from the tax authorities and to 
general moral attitudes, etc.“ (Mogensen, et. al. 1995 p. 5).  
 
Methods of Measuring the Hidden Economy 
 
This study is different from the earlier underground economy studies conducted in the 
Indian context by Gupta and Mehta (1981), Chopra (1982), Acharya (1985), 
Bhattacharyya (1999), and Bhattacharyya and Ghose (1998) in the following way: 
a)  While Acharya (1985), Bhattacharyya (1999), and Bhattacharyya and Ghose 
(1998) used traditional cash demand estimation methodology, which has been 
criticized in the literature for its focus on just one facet of the hidden 
economy, this work uses the MIMIC model. Gupta and Mehta (1981) have 
used a physical input approach where as Chopra’s method is in close line with 
the one suggested by Kaldor (1956).
4  
b)  The uniqueness of the study hinges on the fact that it addresses the crucial 
question: Does an increase in the presence of civic institutions like media have 
a contractionary effect on the size of the hidden economy of a democracy like 
India?  
 
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the hidden economy by Multiple Indicator Multiple 
Cause approach (MIMIC).  Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) were the first to employ 
this methodology for the estimation of the hidden economy of a cross-section of 17 
                                                 
4) Kaldor (1956) tried to estimate the size of the hidden economy in India, by estimating the 
income that avoided the income tax. 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  6 
OECD countries for the period of 1960-78. They borrowed from the statistical theory of 
unobserved variables developed by the likes of Zellner (1970), Goldberger (1972) and 
Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) which considers multiple causes and multiple indicators 
of the phenomenon to be measured and used a factor-analytic approach to measure the 
hidden economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown coefficients were 
estimated separately through a set of structural equations with the indicator variables 
being used to capture the effect of the unobserved variables indirectly. Through their 
analysis Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) arrived at a ranking of OECD countries on the 
basis of the size of their underground economies- e.g. in the late ‘70s Scandinavian and 
Benelux countries were seen to have very large hidden economies followed by US in the 
middle rung and then by Switzerland and Japan which exhibit very small sizes of 
underground activity for that period. Also growth rates wise, Denmark, Belgium and 
Italy’s hidden segment seem to have grown at an above average pace while Canada, UK 
and USA’s hidden economy was found to be below the average rate. Another study by 
Aigner, Schneider and Ghosh (1988) uses a variant of the MIMIC approach- the 
DYMIMIC (the dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes approach) to assess the size 
of the US hidden economy for the time period 1939-1982. The results of this study have 
found a peak in the US hidden economy size around 1943-44 and a trough in 1967-68.  
 
In recent years a lot of work has been done using the unobserved or latent variable 
approach, particularly in the context of New Zealand and Canada. Giles (1999a, 1999b), 
Giles and Caragata (2001), and Giles and Tedds (2002) have used the time series data for 
the New Zealand and the Canadian economy, to arrive at hidden economy estimates, 
using the MIMIC approach.   
 
4. Methodology  
This paper estimates the size of the unobserved hidden or underground economy in India 
using a factor- analytic Multiple Indicator Multiple (MIMIC)5 variable approach. The 
empirical methodology that is used has been adopted from the statistical theory of 
                                                 
5) See Zellner (1970), Goldberger (1972), Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  7 
unobserved variables, which focus on the multiple determinants or causes contributing to 
the development of the hidden economy as also the factors, which can be conceived as 
the indicators of its presence. The estimation of the size of the hidden economy over 
time, which is the latent or unobservable variable in the model, is done using a factor-
analytic approach. The MIMIC model actually is a variant of the LISREL (linear 
Independent Structural Relationships) models of Joreskog and Sorbom (1993a,b) and 
others. These kinds of models can only yield a time-series index for the latent variables 
expressed as percentage of the measured GDP. After that this ordinal index has to be 
converted into a cardinal series of values of hidden economy sizes by scaling up the 
ordinal values to some cardinal value that has been obtained in the past through other 
methods of estimation like the electricity or the currency demand approach.  
The MIMIC model equations can be stated as: 
  y  =  λη + ε         ( 1 )  
  η = γ'x + ζ         ( 2 )  
where, y is a column vector of ‘p’ indicators of the latent variable, η, and x is a column 
vector of the ‘q’ "causes" of η. In other words, equation (1) is the measurement model for 
η and equation (2) is the structural equation for the latent variable, η.  ε is a (px1) 
measurement error while ζ is the scalar structural error. It is assumed that ζ and all the 
elements of  ε are mutually uncorrelated, with Var (ζ) = ψ, and Cov (ε) = Θε.  
Substituting (2) into (1), the MIMIC model can be conceived as a p-equation multivariate 
regression model that takes the standard form, 
y = Πx + z,                                                                                                                    (3) 
where Π = λγ′, z = λζ + ε, and Cov .(z) = λλ′ψ + Θε.                          
The p-equation model in (3) seems to have a regression matrix of rank equal to one and 
an error covariance matrix that is similarly constrained. The first condition is typical in 
simultaneous equation models where the removal of a few exogenous variables from the 
structural equation might cause a part of the reduced form coefficient matrix to be short-
ranked. The singularity property of the error covariance matrix develops because for the 
measurement model to be estimated it has to be normalized first. This implies that the 
estimation of (1) and (2) can be carried only after (1) is normalized by setting one 
element of λ to a pre-assigned value. This justifies our contention that only ordinal 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  8 
estimates can be obtained from this exercise i.e. we obtain relative vis-à-vis level 
estimates.  We estimate the model using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure. 
We use different combinations of the causes and indicators to arrive at different hidden 
economy estimates. For the indicators, on the whole we use the growth rate of real GDP 
of the economy and the cash to M3 ratio of the economy or the level of cash circulation 
in real terms in the economy. The causal variables are chosen as different combinations 
from the set of variables including inflation, the number of persons working in the public 
sector and the ratio of indirect taxes, direct taxes and corporate taxes over GDP in the 
five different MIMIC specifications that we will dwell upon in this chapter. After 
obtaining the ordinal series, cardinal estimates are obtained by calibration to some other 
hidden economy estimate obtained from other studies.  
As we have maintained earlier, the last empirical exercise intends to test the effect that 
civic institutions like media, political institutions or characteristics the growth of the 
hidden economy estimates. The regression equation for this model takes the standard 
form: 
              t t t t t cp bn a h ε + + + = ∆                                                                        (4) 
where ∆ht represents the increment in the size of India’s hidden economy at time period 
‘t’, nt refers to the total newspaper circulation per capita of India in time period ‘t’. The 
variable pt consists of two political characteristics: the election, a binary variable that 
equals one if a Parliament election takes place in year ‘t’ and a variable representing the 
government characteristics in terms of coalition measuring the proportion of year ‘t’ 
where a coalition government rules India.  One may think that during the time of the 
election the government may try to curb the size of the hidden economy.  So, we would 
expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative.  The error term is denoted by ￿t.   
 
5. Data and Empirical results 
5.1 Description of the Variables  
This paper basically uses two sets of variables- (1) the variables that enter as the causes 
and indicators in the MIMIC model (2) the variables like newspaper circulation and the 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  9 
political characteristics that come into the picture in the final stage of our econometric 
exercise where we try to study the effect of civic institutions like the media and the 
political institutions like coalition governance and political externalities like special 
election year behavior. The data sources for these variables are listed in the Data 
Appendix. Table 2 lists out a detailed account of the different variables used for the 
MIMIC specification and also their full names since convenient abbreviations are being 
used otherwise throughout this paper.   
 
5.2 Unit Root Tests 
 
The MIMIC approach might suffer from the standard problem of data non-stationarity. 
To correct for this problem we have conducted a series of Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) tests to check for the presence of unit roots in the data variables.  The lag-length 
for the ADF tests is selected by the procedure suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991).  
Among the casual variables used in our analysis, indirect taxes over GDP and the number 
of people in public employment have been found to be I(1) variables at 10 percent levels 
of significance while among the indicator variables both the cash to M3 ratio and the 
level of real currency seem to be I(1) variables. For all these four variables the first 
differences have been considered in our analysis. Table 3 gives the relevant unit root test 
results. 
 
5.3 The MIMIC Model’s Estimates of the Hidden Economy of India 
 
In this sub-section we shall present the hidden economy estimates of four different 
models using varied combinations of causal and indicator variables. The combinations as 
also the estimation results are shown in Table 4. In these models we have tried to study 
the hidden economy determined by inflation, the first difference of indirect tax to GDP 
ratio, the first difference of the number of public employees as also either the direct tax to 
GDP or the corporate tax to GDP ratios. The indicators used include the growth of real 
GDP per capita and either the first difference of the currency to M3 ratio or the first 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  10 
difference of the real level of currency in the economy. Model 1 and 3 focus on the use of 
the growth rate of real GDP and the first difference of the real level of currency as the 
two indicator variables with Model 1 (Model 3) using the inflation rate, the first 
difference of the number of public employees and the indirect tax and the corporate tax 
(direct tax) to GDP ratios as the causal variables.  As the Table 3 estimates seem to 
suggest, in both these models inflation and the number of public employees exhibit a 
negative and significant effect on the size of the hidden economy in India. The 
contractionary effect of the increase in number of public employees on the hidden 
economy might be conceived as a result of an increase in the number of secure and 
official full-time jobs in the society which might act as a kind of substitute for part-time 
jobs or illegal occupations all of which add to the size of unaccounted incomes. The 
number of public employees however is a variable that is greatly different from the ratio 
of public employment to the total employment that can be better explained as a proxy of 
the level of regulation in the economy and has often been found to possess a positive sign 
in the hidden economy literature. The sign of the inflation variable can be explained by 
the fact that with increase in inflation the real incomes of families might fall and this 
might prompt more people to join the official labor force. One example one can borrow 
from history to explain this fact is the case of Lebanon where hyperinflation and the 
deterioration in the local currency, prompted a considerable number of Lebanese to join 
the labor market in order to make up for declining family incomes. In fact, the total labor 
force increased by 54.4 percent between 1970 and 1987 against an increase in the 
resident population amounting to 35 percent only. In the literature however inflation has 
been found to exhibit both positive or negative impact on the hidden activities because in 
the face of inflationary pressures whether the public, whose real incomes have declined 
will opt for the official labor force or the underground economy, will depend on other 
factors like tax morality, culture as also future expectations among the populace. As a 
study across our models seems to suggest, in India inflation generally seems to have 
exerted a negative effect on the size of shadow activities, though in model 2 and 4 (where 
we use the cash to M3 ratio as one of the indicators along with the growth rate of Real 
GDP) we do find a positive though insignificant relation between the two. Both the 
indirect tax to GDP ratio and the direct/corporate tax to GDP ratios in India seem to 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  11 
exhibit an expected positive effect on the hidden economy size. This seems to endorse the 
view in the literature that an increase in tax burdens is one of the prime reasons for the 
ballooning of the underground activities over time around the globe. 
Table 5 represents various diagnostic statistics for our estimated models.  In almost all 
the models, the diagnostic statistics give a satisfactory result in terms of model fit.  As 
has already been mentioned in this paper earlier, a cardinal series needs to be generated 
from the ordinal index after its estimation. This can be done by scaling the available 
ordinal series using ‘benchmark estimates’ from other studies (Schneider 2000) or by 
estimating an cardinal series through some other approach say the physical indicator 
approach or the cash demand approach (Giles 1997a) and using values from it to calibrate 
the ordinal series obtained by the MIMIC approach. In the present paper we adopted the 
first option. We have used Bhattacharyya’s (1999) hidden economy estimate for India, of 
22.5 percent for 1989-90, to scale up our ordinal hidden economy series to arrive at the 
complete cardinal underground economy sizes for India. The implied hidden economy 
series are plotted in Figure 1 for both Model 1 and Model 2.  Table 6 presents the size of 
the hidden economy as a percentage of measured GDP where as Figure 1 provides an 
annual time-series of the India’s hidden economy, as a percentage of measured GDP. 
This series was generated by multiplying the causal variables' data, by their associated 
estimated coefficients (the elements of ￿ in equation (2)) as shown for MIMIC Model 2 
in Table 4.   The size of the hidden economy has increased from 8.99 percent (1960/61) 
to 23.20 percent (1997/98) over the time period under study.  
 
5.4 The role of Political and Institutional Factors 
 
In this sub-section, we present the result from estimation of equation (4). The result is 
presented in Table 7. Our results show that irrespective of the model, newspaper 
circulation exerts a negative significant impact on the increment in the size of the hidden 
economy. If one interprets the hidden economy as the level of corruption, it tells us that 
an increase in the public voice (as captured by per capita circulation of newspaper), the 
extent of corruption is negatively associated.  Kaufmann (1999) considers knowledge and 
information, leadership and collective action as the prime weapons with which to tackle 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  12 
corruption. This translates to a need for better-defined civic institutions and advocacy 
agents like the media. Such reform in society can be effectively achieved only if it is a 
concerted effort of the government, the media and other civic institutions. Stapenhurst 
(2000) provides a terse portrayal of the link between an active media and the amelioration 
of corruption as also the shadow activities of the economy. He says that journalists can 
exert tangible and intangible pressures for cleaner and more broad-based governance. The 
tangible effects might be in the form of press reports that bring down governments or 
lead to resignation of prominent officials in government office while the intangible 
effects might be in the form of the creation of sentiments in the society that enhance 
political pluralism, encourage public debate and dialogue and force accountability in to 
the lives of politicians and public officials, through reactionary and objective journalism 
(Stapenhurst 2000). This is basically the kind of idea that has also been popularized by 
the civic journalism movement in recent years. Responsible and strong journalism can 
actually open the eyes of the public and even the government at times to the yawning 
flaws in policy, laws and regulations, all of which encourage the prevalence of corruption 
and shady governance and might swing the mood of the nation or state towards hard 
hitting policy reform. That is why this paper contends that the media and other civic 
institutions might actually play a more than passive role in bringing forth a reduction in 
the levels of underground or shadow economic activities that take place within a country. 
India, which is a nation with high corruption levels but where fortuitously we still have 
an independent press that is out of the reach of state control, might be the ideal ground 
where such a hypothesis can be tested.  This paper also dwells briefly on the effect that 
political factors might have on the size or on the rate of growth in the size of the 
underground economy in India. 
 
Our results also demonstrate that during the election year the size of the hidden economy 
falls.  The change in the size of the hidden economy is around 0.03 lower in the election 
year than compared to no-election year.  The change in the size is also smaller in case of 
coalition governments than compared to a single-party government in power. 
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6. The Shadow Economy and Shadow Economy Labor Force of 18 Asian Countries 
 
For single countries and sometimes for a small group of countries (like some OECD or 
transition countries) research has been undertaken to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy and shadow economy labor force using various methods and different time 
periods. In the following an attempt is made to estimate the size and development of the 
shadow economy and shadow economy labor force of Asian countries from the beginning 
to the end of the 90s. Hence, to our opinion, for the first time an attempt is made to 
estimate the size of the shadow economy and shadow economy labor force of major 
Asian countries countries with the same estimation method for the same time period.  
 
To estimate the size and development of the shadow economy the Currency Demand and 
the Model (MIMIC) approach are used for 18 Asian Countries. The results are presented 
in the left part of Table 8. If one first starts with the latest results (2000/2001) the largest 
shadow economy has Thailand with 51.9% of official GDP, followed by Sri Lanka with 
43.7% and the Philippines with 42.6%. In the middle-field is India with 22.8%, Israel 
with 21.9% and Taiwan with 19.6%. At the lower end are China with 13.4% 6), New 
Zealand with 12.9% and Japan with 11.3% (compare also Figure 2). If we turn to the 
development of the shadow economies for these 18 Asian countries over time, we see on 
average the shadow economy of these Asian states was 20.6% in the year 1989/90, rose 
to 22.8% in the year 1994/95 and to 26.1% in the year 2000/2001. On average the 
shadow economy of these 18 Asian countries rose over the years 1989/90 to 2000/2001 
by 5.2 percentage points in official GDP, a quite a remarkable increase. This increase can 
also be seen by looking at single countries, e.g. for example by Bangladesh, which had a 
shadow economy of 26.2% in the year 1989/90 and it rose to 34.9% in the year 
2000/2001; or in Thailand, where the shadow economy increased from 44.2% in 1989/90 
to 51.9% in 2000/2001. 
                                                 
6) The calculation of the shadow economy for China is very difficult and the values may be 
questioned because only a part of China has so far been developed into a market economy. A 
great part of China belongs still a planed economy and due to this mix of systems the calculated 
figures may be not very reliable. 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  14 
 
Having examined the size and rise of the shadow economy in terms of value added over 
time, the analysis in the right part of Table 8 focuses on the „shadow“ labor market, as 
within the official labor market there is a particularly tight relationship and “social 
network” between people who are active in the shadow economy.7) Moreover, by 
definition every activity in the shadow economy involves a “shadow” labor market to 
some extent: Hence, the “shadow labor market” includes all cases, where the employees 
or the employers, or both, occupy a „shadow economy position“. Why do people work in 
the shadow economy? In the official labor market, the costs firms (and individuals) have 
to pay when “officially” hiring someone are increased tremendously by the burden of tax 
and social contributions on wages, as well as by the legal administrative regulation to 
control economic activity.8) In various OECD countries, these costs are greater than the 
wage effectively earned by the worker – providing a strong incentive to work in the 
shadow economy.  More detailed theoretical information on the labor supply decision in 
the underground economy is given by Lemieux, Fortin, and Fréchette (1994), who use 
micro data from a survey conducted in Quebec City (Canada). In particular, their study 
provides some economic insight into the size of the distortion caused by income taxation 
and the welfare system. The results of this study suggest that hours worked in the shadow 
economy are quite responsive to changes in the net wage in the regular (official) sector. 
Their empirical results attribute this to miss-allocation of work from the official to the 
informal sector, where it is not taxed. In this case, the substitution between labor-market 
activities in the two sectors is quite high. These empirical findings clearly indicate, that 
“participation rates and hours worked in the underground sector also tend to be inversely 
related to the number of hours worked in the regular sector“ (Lemieux, Fortin, and 
Fréchette 1994 p. 235). These findings demonstrate a large negative elasticity of hours 
worked in the shadow economy with respect both to the wage rate in the regular sector as 
well as to a high mobility between the sectors. 
 
                                                 
7)Pioneering work in this area has been done by L. Frey (1972, 1975, 1978, 1980), Cappiello 
(1986), Lubell (1991), Pozo (1996), Bartlett (1998) and Tanzi (1999). 
8)This is especially true in Europe (e.g. in Germany and Austria), where the total tax and social 
security burden adds up to 100% on top of the wage effectively earned; see also section 5.1. 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  15 
Illicit work can take many shapes. The underground use of labor may consist of a second 
job after (or even during) regular working hours. A second form is shadow economy 
work by individuals who do not participate in the official labor market. A third 
component is the employment of people (e.g. clandestine or illegal immigrants), who are 
not allowed to work in the official economy. Empirical research on the shadow economy 
labor market is even more difficult than of the shadow economy on the value added, since 
one has very little knowledge about how many hours an average “shadow economy 
worker” is actually working (from full time to a few hours, only); hence, it is not easy to 
provide empirical facts.9) 
 
The following results of portraying the shadow economy labor force are based on the 
World Bank database on informal employment in major cities all over the world as well 
as on other sources (see footnote 8). The values of the shadow economy labor force are 
calculated in absolute terms and in percent of the official labor force under the 
assumption, that in rural areas the shadow economy is at least as high as in the cities. 
This is a conservative assumption, as in reality the shadow economy will most likely be 
even larger in rural areas.10) The following results are preliminary and should be treated 
as a first attempt to calculate the shadow economy labor force. 
 
If we consider the size of the shadow economy labor force in % of the “official” labor 
force, we again see, that Thailand has for the year 1989/90 by far the biggest shadow 
economy labor force with 40% of the official one (compare also figure 3), followed by 
Indonesia with 31.3% and Sri Lanka with 31.3%. In the middle field is Malaysia with 
25.1%, China with 20.5% and Korea (South) with 19.6%. At the lower end is New 
Zealand with 9.2%, Australia with 8.1% and Japan with 7.1% of the “official” labor 
                                                 
9)For developing countries some literature about the shadow labour market exists, e.g. the latest 
works by Dallago (1990), Pozo (1996), Loayza (1996), especially Chickering and Salahdine 
(1991). 
10) This assumption, that the shadow economy labor force is at least as high as the countryside 
than in major cities, is a very modest one and is supported by Lubell (1991) and Bartlett (1998). 
Some authors (e.g. Lubell (1991), Pozo (1996) and Chickering and Slahdine (1991)) argue that 
the shadow economy labor force is up to twice as high on the country side compared to the one of 
the major cities. But as there exists no (precise) figures about this ratio the assumption of equal 
size may be justified arguing that such a calculation provides at least minimal figures. 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  16 
force. From this result one can see that the shadow economy labor force has reached quite 
a considerable size and if we finally consider the absolute terms (people in millions), of 
course, the great nations have the biggest shadow economy labor force, e.g. China with 
152.4 millions of “full-time shadow economy workers”, followed by India with 117.2 
millions of “full-time shadow economy workers” and then by Indonesia with 30.7 
millions of “full-time shadow economy workers”.11)    
 
7. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
 
The basic findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
 
1) The size of the hidden economy in India has shown an increasing trend over the years, 
varying from 8.9% (1960/61) to about 23% (1997/98). 
2) An increased growth of newspapers translate to cleaner governance, e.g. to less 
amount of shadow economy activities in the economy. 
3) If one compares the size of the shadow economy of India with other Asian states, the 
shadow economy of India is in the lower end and in a lot of countries the shadow 
economy like Korea or Bangladesh is much higher. 
4) The average size of the shadow economy of 18 Asian countries in the 1989/90 was 
20.6% and in 2000/01 rose to 26.1%, which means an increase of 4.5 percentage points 
over these 10 years. 
 
In general, analysis of this paper shows that political institutions may be quite influential 
with respect to the size of the shadow economy and corruption. The better democracy is 
functioning the more convinced voters are that there taxes are used in the way they wish, 
the lower is the size of the shadow economy. This is a first and tentative result and has to 
be confirmed with additional empirical and theoretical research. 
                                                 
11) It should be clearly emphasized, that the following values have been calculated under the 
extreme assumption, that a “full-time shadow economy worker” is as productive as his colleague 
in the official economy. If this were not the case, the figure would even increase. Moreover the 
assumption of a full time shadow economy worker is extreme. Most people working in the 
shadow economy have an “official” job, too, so that the figure of “full time shadow economy 
workers” is an artifact – being done the check how many jobs the shadow economy occupies!  03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  17 
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1) Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks. 
 
Table 2: Index of Variables Used in MIMIC Model 
Names of the 
variables used 
Description of the variables used 
INDICATOR VARIABLES 
grgdp  Growth rate of Real GDP  
cashm3  The currency to M3 ratio 
dcashm3  The first difference of the currency to M3 ratio 
rcurr  the level of real currency in the economy 
drcurr  the first difference of level of real currency in the economy  
CAUSAL VARIABLES 
inflation  the log of the ratio of current year’s CPI to previous year’s CPI 
corgdp  the ratio of total corporate taxes to nominal GDP 
dirtgdp  the ratio of total direct taxes to nominal GDP 
indigdp  the ratio of total indirect taxes to nominal GDP 
dindgdp  the first difference of the ratio of total indirect taxes to nominal GDP 
npubemp  the number of persons employed in the public sector  (comprising of the central 
govts.+ state govts. + quasi central and state govt.s + local bodies) 
dnpubemp  the first difference of the number of persons employed in the public sector 
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Table 3: Results from Unit Root Tests (Augmented Dickey- Fuller Tests) 
 
Variables Test-Statistics  Selected  Lag-length 
Ln(Realgdp) -0.290  4 
Grgdp -5.181  3 
CashM3 -2.035  1 
DcashM3 -4.298  0 
LN(Rcurrr) -2.238  1 
Drcurr -1681.543  0 
Ln(CPI) -0.335  4 
Inflation -6.194  3 
Corgdp -2.856  0 
Dirtgdp -4.199  3 
Indgdp -2.228  0 
Dindgdp -5.389  0 
Npubemp   1.594  0 
Dnpubemp -4.177  1 
 
 
Table 4: MIMIC MODEL RESULTS and the PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
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Table 5: Diagnostic Statistics of the Estimated MIMIC Model 
 
  MODEL1 MODEL  2 MODEL3  MODEL4 
Chi-Square 0.74  3.03  0.73  2.92 
[p-value] 0.86  0.39  0.87  0.40 
RMSEA 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
P-Value for Test of 
Close Fit (RMSEA < 
0.05) 
0.88 0.45 0.88 0.46 
RMR (Root mean square 
residual) 
0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 
Adjusted Goodness of 
Fit (AGFI) 
0.95 0.82 0.95 0.82 
PGFI (Parsimony 
Goodness of Fit) 
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
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Table 6:  Size of the Hidden Economy for India a s a percent of Measured GDP (1960-61: 
1997-98) 
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Table 7: Regression results for the Change in the Size of the Hidden Economy  
 


















































R²  0.194 0.203 0.194 0.203 0.194 0.203 0.194 0.203 


















                         
                             
Figure 1: Time Path for the Indian Hidden Economy as a 








1961-62   
1963-64   
1965-66   
1967-68   
1969-70   
1971-72  
1973-74   
1975-76   
1977-78   
1979-80   
1981-82   
1983-84   
1985-86   
1987-88   
1989-90   
1991-92   
1993-94   
1995-96   
1997-98   
Model1 Model203.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  22 
 





























































































































































































































































































































































































 03.04.03; C:\Studien\Chaudhury\Thehiddepaper1a.doc  23 
Table 8: The Size of the Shadow Economy and of the Shadow Economy Labor Force of 18 Asian Countries 
 
Size of the Shadow Economy  
(in % of “official”GDP) 












in % of 
“official” 
Labor Force 
in % of 
Population 
  1 Australia  10.1  13.5  14.3           0.81              8.1   4.3 
  2 Bangladesh  26.2  30.2  34.9  17.72  27.7  14.1 
  3 China  -  10.2  13.4  152.43  20.5  12.3 
  4 Hong Kong  13.0  15.3  16.5             0.46  13.2   8.1 
  5 India  18.1  20.3  22.8  117.23  27.2  11.9 
  6 Indonesia  10.4  15.4  18.9  30.74  31.3  15.1 
  7 Israel  14.3  17.1  21.9    0.51  16.7   8.2 
  8 Japan  8.8  10.6  11.3            4.76    7.1   3.8 
  9 Korea (South)  19.4  22.4  26.7            4.51  19.6   9.7 
10 Malaysia  26.4  28.3  30.9             2.25  25.1  10.1 
11 Nepal  32.6  33.4  37.4    3.34  30.4  14.4 
12 New Zealand  9.2  11.3  12.9            0.18    9.2  4.7 
13 Pakistan  28.2  31.4  35.9  15.23  31.0  11.6 
14 Philippines  34.2  38.4  42.6    9.82  30.6  13.0 
15 Singapore  9.4  11.2  13.7    0.21  10.2   6.3 
16 Sri Lanka  30.4  35.3  43.7    2.54  31.3  13.3 
17 Taiwan  15.3  17.4  19.6    1.95  14.5   8.7 
18 Thailand  44.2  48.3  51.9  14.83  40.0  20.1 
(Unweighted) Average 
of the 18 Countries 
20.6 22.8  26.1  21.14  21.9  10.5 
Source: Own calculations.   24
 
8. Data Appendix:   
      
Data on India’s currency, M3, growth rate of real GDP, population, CPI, and inflation 
variables have been compiled from various volumes of the Handbook of Statistics on the 
Indian Economy, published annually by the Reserve bank of India. The data of the tax 
variables used as causal factors in the empirical MIMIC analysis, has been obtained from 
several issues of the Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Department of 
Economic Affairs, Government of India.  The data on the number of public employees has 
been collected from some volumes of the publication Statistical Abstract of the Government 
of India.  Data on India’s total newspaper circulation was obtained from Press in India, 
published by the Registrar of Newspapers on behalf of the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, Government of India. The political variables have been arranged and compiled 
from a wide range of sources. India’s election and the data on coalition have been constructed 
with the help of information on elections from the book India Decides
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Acharya, Shankar N. (1985): Aspects of the black economy in India, Report of a Study by 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Ministry of Finance, Government of 
India.   
Aigner, Dennis; Schneider, Friedrich and Damayanti Ghosh (1988): Me and my shadow: 
estimating the size of the US hidden economy from time series data, in W. A. Barnett; E. 
R. Berndt and H. White (eds.): Dynamic econometric modeling, Cambridge (Mass.): 
Cambridge University Press, 224-243. 
Bagachwa, M.S.D. and Naho, A. (1995): Estimating the second economy in Tanzania, World 
Development, 23, 1387-1399. 
Bartlett, Bruce (1998): Corruption, the underground economy, and taxation. Washington 
D.C.: National Center for Policy Analysis, unpublished manuscript.  
Bhattacharyya, Dilip K. (1999): On the economic rationale of estimating the hidden 
Economy, The Economic Journal 109/456, 348-359.  
Bhattacharyya, Dilip K. and Susmita Ghose (1998): Corruption in India and the hidden 
economy, Economic and Political Weekly, October 31, 2795-2799. 
Campbell, John Y and Perron Pierre (1991): Pitfalls and Opportunities: What 
Macroeconomists Should Know about Unit Roots, NBER Macroeconomics Annual MIT 
Press 141-201 
Cappiello, M.A: (1986): “Proposita di bibliografia ragionata sull’economia sommersa 
nell’industria (Italia 1970-82)”, pp. 307-345, in: Bagnasco, A. (ed.): L’altra metà 
dell’economia. La ricerca internazionale sull’economia informale, Liguori, Naples. 
Chickering, Lawrence A. and Muhamed Salahdine (eds.) (1991): The silent revolution-The 
informal sector in five Asian and near Eastern countries, San Francisco: An International 
Center for Economic Growth Publication (ICS Press). 
Chopra, O. P. (1982): Unaccounted income: some estimates, Economic and Political Weekly, 
April 24. 
Dallago, Bruno (1990): The irregular economy: The “underground economy” and the “black 
labor market”, Dartmouth (U.K.), Publishing Company. 
                                                 
12 Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri, and Prannoy Roy (1996), India Decides, Elections 1952-1995, New 
Delhi:  Living Media India Limited.    25
Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee, Final Report, known as Wanchoo Committee Report 
(1971), Ministry of Finance, Government of India. 
Feige, Edgar L. (1989) (ed.): The underground economies. Tax evasion and information 
distortion. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press. 
Feige, Edgar L. (1994): The underground economy and the currency enigma, Supplement to 
Public Finance/ Finances Publiques, 49, pp. 119-136. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Werner Pommerehne (1984): The hidden economy: State and prospect for 
measurement, Review of Income and Wealth, 30/1, pp. 1-23. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1984): The hidden economy as an 
“unobserved” variable, European Economic Review, 26/1, pp. 33-53. 
Frey, L. (1972): Il lavoro a domicilio in Lombardia, Giunta Regionale Lombarda, Assessorato 
al Lavoro, Milan. 
Frey, L. (1975): Il potenziale di lavoro in Italia, Documenti ISVET, no. 50. 
Frey, L. (1978): “Il lavoro nero nel 1977 in Italia”, Tendenze della occupazione, no. 6. 
Frey, L. (1980): “Introduzione all’analisi economica del lavoro minorile”, Economia del 
Lavoro, no. 1-2, pp. 5-16.  
Giles, D. E. A. (1999a): The rise and fall of the New Zealand underground economy: are the 
responses symmetric?, Applied Economics Letters, 6, 185-189. 
Giles, D. E. A. (1999b): Modelling the hidden economy and the tax-gap in New Zealand, 
Empirical Economics, 24, 621-640. 
Giles, D.E.A. & P.J. Caragata (2001): The Learning Path of the Hidden Economy: Tax and 
Growth Effects in New Zealand, Applied Economics, 33, 1857-1867. 
Giles, D. E. A. and Tedds, L. M. (2002): Taxes and the Canadian Underground Economy, 
Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto.  
Goldberger, A. S. (1972): Structural equation models in the social sciences. Econometrica, 
40, 979-1001. 
Gupta, P. and R. Mehta (1981): An estimate of underreported national income. Journal of 
Income and Wealth, vol.5, no. 2. 
Johnson, Simon; Kaufmann, Daniel; and Andrei Shleifer (1997): The unofficial economy in 
transition, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, Washington D.C. 
Johnson, Simon; Kaufmann, Daniel and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón (1998a): Regulatory discretion 
and the unofficial economy. American Economic Review, 88/ 2, pp. 387-392.  
Joreskog, K.G., and Goldberger, A.S. (1975): Estimation of a model with multiple indicators 
and multiple causes of a single latent variable. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 70, 631-639. 
Joreskog, K., and Sorbom, J. (1993a): LISREL 8: Structural equation modeling with the 
Simplis command language. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Joreskog, K., and Sorbom, J. (1993b): LISREL 8: User's reference guide. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Kaldor, N. (1956): Indian tax reform: report of a survey", Ministry of Finance, Government 
of India.  
Kaufman, Daniel (1999): Economic reforms: necessary but not sufficient to curb corruption, 
in “Curbing Corruption”, World bank, Washington D.C. 
Lemieux, Thomas; Fortin, Bernard; and Pierre Fréchette (1994):The effect of taxes on labor 
supply in the underground economy. American Economic Review, 84/No. 1, pp. 231-254. 
Lippert, Owen and Michael Walker (eds.) (1997): The underground economy: Global 
evidences of its size and impact, Vancouver, B.C.: The Frazer Institute. 
Loayza, Norman V. (1996): The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some 
empirical evidence from Latin America. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy 45, pp. 129-162.   26
Lubell, Herald (1991): The informal sector in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Paris: OECD. 
Mogensen, Gunnar V.; Kvist, Hans K.; Körmendi, Eszter and Soren Pedersen (1995): The 
shadow economy in Denmark 1994: Measurement and results, Study no. 3, Copenhagen: 
The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit. 
Pozo, Susan (ed.) (1996): Exploring the underground economy: Studies of illegal and 
unreported activity, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn, Institute for Employment Research. 
Report of the Central Excise (Self Removal Procedure) Review Committee, The 
Venkatappiah Committee Report, Government of India. 
Report of the Committee on Controls and Subsidies (1979), Chairman Mr. Dagli, Ministry of 
Finance, Government of India. 
Stapenhurst, Rick (2000): The Media’s role in curbing corruption, World Bank Institute 
Working Paper, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Schneider, Friedrich (1986): Estimating the size of the Danish shadow economy using the 
currency demand approach: An attempt, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 88/4, 
643-668. 
Schneider, Friedrich (1994a): Measuring the size and development of the shadow economy. 
Can the causes be found and the obstacles be overcome? in: Brandstaetter, Hermann, and 
Güth, Werner (eds.): Essays on Economic Psychology, Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer 
Publishing Company, 193-212. 
Schneider, Friedrich (1994b): Can the shadow economy be reduced through major tax 
reforms? An empirical investigation for Austria, Supplement to Public Finance/ Finances 
Publiques, 49, 137-152. 
Schneider, Friedrich (1997): The shadow economies of Western Europe, Journal of the 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 17/3, 42-48. 
Schneider, Friedrich (1998): Further empirical results of the size of the shadow economy of 
17 OECD-countries over time, Paper presented at the 54. Congress of the IIPF Cordowa, 
Argentina and discussion paper, Department of Economics, University of Linz, Linz, 
Austria. 
Schneider, Friedrich and Dominik Enste (2000): Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and 
Consequences, The Journal of Economic Literature, 38/1, 77-114. 
Smith, J.D (1985): Market motives in the informal economy, in: Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A. 
(eds.): The economics of the shadow economy, Heidelberg: Springer Publishing 
Company, 161-177. 
Tanzi, Vito (1999): Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy, The 
Economic Journal 109/456, 338-340. 
Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht (1997): Reconsidering the fiscal role of government: the 
international perspective. American Economic Review, 87/2, 164-68. 
Thomas, Jim J. (1992): Informal economic activity, LSE, Handbooks in Economics, London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Zellner, A. (1970): Estimation of regression relationships containing unobservable 
independent variables, International Economic Review, 441-454. 
   27
WORKINGPAPERS  1991-2003 




9101  WEISS, Christoph: Price inertia and market structure under 
incomplete information. Jänner 1991. in: Applied Economics, 
1992. 
9102  BARTEL, Rainer: Grundlagen der Wirtschaftspolitik und ihre 
Problematik. Ein einführender Leitfaden zur Theorie der Wirt-
schaftspolitik. Jänner 1991; Kurzfassung erschienen unter: 
Wirtschaftspolitik in der Marktwirtschaft, in: Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, 17. 1991,2, S. 229-249 
9103  FALKINGER, Josef: External effects of information. Jänner 
1991 
9104  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich; Mechanik und Ökonomie: Keplers 
Traum und die Zukunft. Jänner 1991, in: R. Sandgruber und F. 
Schneider (Hrsg.), "Interdisziplinarität Heute", Linz, Trauner, 
1991 
9105  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef, WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Man-
power training programs and employment stability, in:  Econo-
mica,  63. 1995, S. 128-130 
9106  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Partial retirement and the earnings test. 
Februar 1991, in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie / Journal of 
Economics, 57. 1993,3, S. 295-303 
9107  FALKINGER, Josef: The impacts of policy on quality and 
price in a vertically integrated sector. März 1991. Revidierte 
Fassung: On the effects of price or quality regulations in a 
monopoly market, in: Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft. 
9108  PFAFFERMAYR, Michael, WEISS, Christoph R., ZWEI-
MÜLLER, Josef: Farm income, market wages, and off-farm 
labour supply, in: Empirica, 18, 2, 1991, S. 221-235 
9109  BARTEL, Rainer, van RIETSCHOTEN, Kees: A perspective 
of modern public auditing. Pleading for more science and less 
pressure-group policy in public sector policies. Juni 1991, dt. 
Fassung: Eine Vision von moderner öffentlicher Finanzkon-
trolle, in: Das öffentliche Haushaltswesen in Österreich, 32. 
1991,3-4, S. 151-187 
9110  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich and LENZELBAUER, Werner: An 
inverse relationship between efficiency and profitability accor-
ding to the size of Upper--Austrian firms? Some further 
tentative results, in: Small Business Economics, 5. 1993,1, S. 1-
22 
9111 SCHNEIDER,  Friedrich:  Wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen zur 
Steigerung der Effizienz der österreichischen Gemeinwirtschaft: 
Ein Plädoyer für eine aktivere Industrie- und Wettbewerbspoli-
tik. Juli 1991, in: Öffentliche Wirtschaft und Gemeinwirtschaft 
in Österreich, Wien, Manz, 1992, S. 90-114 
9112  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf, ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Unequal 
promotion on job ladders, in: Journal of Labor Economics, 15. 
1997,1,1, S. 70-71 
9113  BRUNNER, Johann K.: Bargaining with reasonable aspira-
tions. Oktober 1991, in: Theory and Decision, 37, 1994, S 311-
321. 
9114  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef, WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Gender 
wage differentials and private and public sector jobs. Oktober 
1991, in: Journal of Population Economics,  7. 1994, S. 271-
285 
9115  BRUNNER, Johann K., WICKSTRÖM, Bengt-Arne: Poli-
tically stable pay-as-you-go pension systems: Why the social-
insurance budget is too small in a democracy. November 1991, 
in: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie = Journal of Economics, 7. 
1993, S. 177-190. 
9116  WINTER-EBMER; Rudolf, ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Occu-
pational segregation and career advancement. Dezember 1991, 
in: Economics Letters, 39. 1992, S. 229-234 
 
*** 
9201  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Ecological objectives in a market 
economy: Three simple questions, but no simple answers? 
Jänner 1992, in: Giersch, H. (Hrsg.), Environmental economics, 
Heidelberg, Springer-Verl., 1993 
9202  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: The federal and fiscal structures of 
representative and direct democracies as models for a European 
federal union: Some preliminary ideas using the public-choice 
approach, in: Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 
3. 1993,2 
9203  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: The development of the shadow 
economy under changing economic conditions: Some tentative 
empirical results for Austria. Revised version. März 1992. 
9204  HACKL, Franz, SCHNEIDER, Friedrich, WITHERS, Glenn: 
The public sector in Australia: A quantitative analysis. März 
1992, in: Gemmell, N. (ed), The growth of the public sector, 
Aldershot, Elgar, 1993, S. 212-231 
9205  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: The federal and fiscal structures of 
western democracies as models for a federal union in former 
communist countries? Some thoughts using the public-choice 
approach. April 1992, in: Wagner, H.-J. (ed.), On the theory and 
policy of systematic change, Heidelberg, Springer-Verl., 1993, 
S. 135-154 
9206  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Endogenous growth, human 
capital, and industry wages. in: Bulletin of Economic Research, 
4/1994, 289-314. 
9207  BARTEL, Rainer: Gleichgewicht, Ungleichgewicht und 
Anpassung in der komparativen Statik. August 1992; 1. Teil 
erschienen unter: Auf welchen Grundlagen beruhen unsere 
ökonomischen Aussagen? in: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 19, 
2, 1993, S. 153-170; 2. Teil erschienen unter: Neoklassische 
Rationierung, in: WiSt, 23, 3, 1993, S. 151-154 
9208  WEISS, Christoph R.: Market structure and pricing behaviour 
in Austrian manufacturing. August 1992. in: Empirica, 21. 
1994,  S. 115-131. 
9209  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Unemployment and individual 
pay: Wage curve or compen-sating differentials? erscheint 
u.d.T.: Wage Curve, Unemployment Duration and 
Compensating Differentials, in: Labour Economics, 3/1996,4, 
S. 425-434 
9210  SCHUSTER, Helmut: Chaostheorie und Verkehrswissen-
schaft? September 1992, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Verkehrswissenschaft, 1-2, 38. 1992, S. 48-51 
9211  BARTEL, Rainer, PRUCKNER, Gerald: Strukturelle und 
konjunkturelle Charakteristika der Budgetpolitik von Bund und 
Gesamtstaat in Österreich. Oktober 1992, in: Wirtschafts-
politische Blätter, 40. 1993,2, S. 134-154 
9212  PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: Foreign direct investment and 
exports: A time series approach. Oktober 1992 
9213  HACKL, Franz, SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Austrian economic 
policy since 1945: An ex-ploratory analysis. Oktober 1992, in: 
Paldam, M. (ed.), Economic development of small open 
economies in Europe and South America, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, forthcoming 1994 
9214  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Die Kunst als Wirtschaftsfaktor - 
vernachlässigbar oder beach-tenswert? Oktober 1992, in: 
Musicologica Austriaca, 11. 1993,1, S. 19-29 
9215  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Measuring the size and the deve-
lopment of the shadow economy: Can the causes be found and 
the obstacles be overcome? November 1992, in: Brandstätter, 
Hermann and Güth, W. (eds.), Essays on Economic Psycholo-
gy, Heidelberg, Springer-Verl., 1994, S. 208-211 
9216  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Public choice - economic theory of 
politics: A survey in selected areas. Dezember 1992, in: 
Brandstätter, Hermann and Güth, W. (eds.), Essays on 
Economic Psychology, Heidelberg, Springer-Verl., 1994, S. 
188-192 
   28
*** 
9301  SCHUSTER, Helmut: Energiepolitik im Spannungsfeld 
zwischen Wirtschaft und Umwelt. Jänner 1993, in:  Friedrich 
Schneider (Hrsg.), Energiepolitik in Österreich, Linz, Trauner, 
1993 
9302  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Motivation to migrate and eco-
nomic success. März 1993, erscheint u.d.T.: Motivation for 
Migration and Economic Success, in: Journal of Economic Psy-
chology, 15. 1994, S. 282-284 
9303  LANDESMANN, Michael and GOODWIN, Richard: Pro-
ductivity growth, structural change and macroeconomic 
stability. März 1993 
9304  PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: Foreign outward direct investment 
and exports in Austrian manufacturing. März 1993 
9305  BARTEL, Rainer: Zur Ökonomie der öffentlichen Finanz-
kontrolle. April 1993, erschienen unter: Öffentliche Fi-
nanzkontrolle als politische Machtkontrolle. Eine ökonomische 
Fundierung, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 34. 1993,4, S. 
613-639 
9306  HACKL, Franz: Die Internalisierung von überbetrieblichen 
Leistungen der Landwirtschaft aus allokationstheoretischer 
Sicht. April 1993. 
9307  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef, WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf, FAL-
KINGER, Josef: Retirement of spouses and social security 
reform, in: European Economic Review, 40/1996, S. 471-472 
9308  BRUNNER, Johann K.: Abilities, needs, and the size of the 
cake: an axiomatic bargaining approach to redistributive 
taxation. Juli 1993. 
9309  HACKL, Franz, PRUCKNER, Gerald: Touristische Präfe-
renzen für den ländlichen Raum: Die Problematik ihrer em-
pirischen Erfassung und Internalisierung. Juli 1993. Ersch. in: 
Gesellschaftliche Forderungen an die Landwirtschaft / 
Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des 
Landbaues (GEWISOLA), hrsg. von Konrad Hagedorn ... 
1994, Schriften der GEWISOLA, Bd. 30 
9310  NECK, Reinhard, SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Steuersystem und 
Schattenwirtschaft. Juli 1993. 
9311  POINTNER, Johannes und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Öster-
reich im internationalen Writschaftssystem, August 1993, in:  
Ewald Nowotny und Günther Winckler (Hrsg.), Grundzüge der 
Wirtschaftspolitik Österreichs, 1994. 
9312  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: The Relationship between efficiency 
and profitability with respect to the size of firms: an empirical 
investigation for Austria. September 1993. 
9313  ÖTSCH, Walter: Die mechanistische Metapher in der Theo-
riengeschichte der Nationalökonomie. September 1993. 
9314  BARTEL, Rainer: Wirtschaftspolitische Kontrolle und Be-
ratung: Grundlagen, Probleme, Erfordernisse. September 1993, 
erschienen als: Kontrolle und Beratung in der Wirt-
schaftspolitik, in: Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter, 41. 1994,4, S. 
442-462  
9315  BARTH, Erling and ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Relative wages 
under decentralized and under corporatist bargaining systems, 
in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97. 1995,3, S. 369-384 
9316  FALKINGER, Josef and ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: The impact 
of income inequality on product diversity and economic growth. 
Oktober 1993. 
9317  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Anreizorientierte Systeme im Ge-
sundheitswesen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
stationären Sektors. Oktober 1993. 
9318  HORSTMANN, Winfried and SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: 
Deficits, bailout and free riders: Fiscal elements of European 
constitution. Oktober 1993. 
9319  BARTEL, Rainer: Egoismus, Altruismus, Ineffizienz und 
Kontrolle im öffentlichen Bereich: Ein kurzer Blick auf die 
Argumente und ihre Implikationen. November 1993, in: 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 20. 1994,2, S. 231-246 
9320  BURGER, Christina: Theorien der Koalitionsbildung und ihre 
Anwendbarkeit auf österreichische Regierungen. November 
1993. 
9321  BARTEL, Rainer: Konjunkturelle Selbststabiliseriung oder 
kompensatorische Nachfragepolitik? Ein Leitfaden für Stu-
denten. Dezember 1993, tw. erschienen unter: Konjunk-
turprobleme - Selbstheilung oder Staatseingriffe?, in: WISO, 17. 
1994,4, S. 111-39, erscheint tw. unter: Lohnindexierung - 
Effiziente Institution zur Stabilisierung der Wirtschaft?, in: 
WiSt, 26. 1997,3, S. 154-156 
 
*** 
9401  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf, ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Immi-
gration and the Earnings of Young Native Workers. Jänner 
1994, in: Oxford Economic Papers, 48. 1996, S. 473-491 
9402  KUNST, Robert, HAUSER, Michael: Fractionally Integrated 
Models With ARCH Errors. Jänner 1994. 
9403  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef, WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Internal 
Markets and Firm-Specific Determination of Earnings in the 
Presence of Immigrant Labor, in: Economics Letters, 48. 1995, 
S. 185-191 
9404  SCHUSTER, Helmut: Energie und Umwelt. März 1994. 
9405  PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: Testing for Ownership Advan-
tages of Direct Investing Firms. März 1994. 
9406  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Determinanten der Steuerhinter-
ziehung und der Schwarzarbeit im internationalen Vergleich. 
März 1994. 
9407  FALKINGER, Josef: Social Stability and the Equity-Efficiency 
Trade-off. April 1994. 
9408  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf, ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Do 
Immigrants Displace Native Workers? Mai 1994, erscheint in: 
Journal of Population Economics, 1998. 
9409  FALKINGER, Josef: How to overcome free-riding: Rewarding 
deviations from average. Mai 1994. Revidierte Fassung: 
Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods by Rewarding 
Deviations from Average, in: Journal of Public Economics, 62. 
1996,3, S. 413-422 
9410  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Wealth distribution, innovations, and 
economic growth. Mai 1994. 
9411  GANTNER, Manfried, SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Budget-
ausgliederungen - eine polit-ökonomische Analyse. Juni 1994. 
9412  AIGINGER, Karl: The use of game theoretical models for 
empirical research - A survey of testing  non-cooperative game 
theory with real world data in recent industrial organization 
literature. Juni 1994. 
9413  FALKINGER, Josef: The private provision of public goods 
when the relative size of contribution matters. Juli 1994, in: 
Finanzarchiv, 51, 1994, S. 358 - 371. 
9414  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Sex discrimination and compe-
tition in product and labour markets, in: Applied Economics, 27. 
1995,9, S. 849-857 
9415  FALKINGER, Josef, ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: The cross-
country Engel curve for product diversification, August 1994, 
in: Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 7. 1996,1, S. 
79-97 
9416  FALKINGER, Josef: Tax evasion, consumption of public 
goods and fairness, August 1994, in: Journal of Economics 
Psychology, 16, 1995, S. 63 - 72. 
9417  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Einige Gedanken zur Harmonisierung 
indirekter Steuern in der Europäischen Union, September 1994. 
9418  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Firm size, earnings and dis-
placement risk, Oktober 1994, erscheint in: Economic Inquiry, 
2000. 
9419  WEISS, Christoph: Labour market adjustment in U.S. ma-
nufacturing: Does market structure matter? Oktober 1994. 
9420  WEISS, Christoph: State dependence, symmetry and rever-
sibility of off-farm employment, November 1994. 
9421  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Is there a European public choice 
perspective?, Dezember 1994. 
 
*** 
9501  BARTEL, Rainer: Reform des öffentlichen Sektors - Grund-
lagen und Grundsätze, Jänner 1995.  
9502  RIESE, Martin: The GINI-index as a measure of the goodness 
of prediction, Jänner 1995, in: Bulletin of Economic Research, 
49. 1997,2, S. 127-135. 
9503  AIGINGER, Karl, WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf und ZWEI-
MÜLLER, Josef: Eastern European Trade and the Austrian   29
Labour Market, in: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 132. 1996,3, S. 
476-500 
9504  WEISS, Christoph: Size, Growth, and Survival of Upper 
Austrian Farms in the 1980s, Februar 1995. in: Sotte, F. and 
Zanoli, R.: “The Regional Dimension of Agricultural 
Economics and Politics”, forthcoming (1995). 
9505   BARTEL, Rainer: Umweltpolitik in den Reformländern 
Europas. Voraussetzungen und Erfordernisse, Februar 1995.  
9506  PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: Foreign Outward Direct In-
vestment and Exports in Austrian Manufacturing: Substitutes or 
Complements?, March 1995. 
9507  BURGER, Christina, SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: How Valuable 
is the Health of the Elderly- Evaluation of the Treatment of 
Alzheimer’s Disease; April 1995. 
9508  BRUNNER, Johann, RIESE, Martin: Measuring the Severity of 
Unemployment, April 1995. 
9509  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Volkswirtschaftliche Aspekte der 
Mitarbeiterbeteiligung, Mai 1995. 
9510  ÖTSCH, Walter: Erwartungen und Framing. Keynes und die 
”Anomalien” der Erwartungsnutzentheorie, Mai 1995. 
9511  ÖTSCH, Walter: Die Herausforderung des Konstruktivismus 
für die ökonomische Theorie, Mai 1995, in: Birger P. Priddat 
und Gerhard Wegner, Hrsg., Zwischen Evolution und 
Institution, Metropolis-Verl., Marburg, 1996, S. 35 - 55 
9512  ÖTSCH, Walter: Kreativität und Logik im ökonomischen 
Handlungsmodell, Mai 1995. 
9513  WEISS, Christoph: Determinants of Farm Survival and 
Growth, Mai 1995. 
9514  BARTEL, Rainer: Zum Verhältnis von Ökonomie und Politik 
des öffentlichen Sektors. Einige kurze Anmerkungen, Juni 
1995.  
9515  KUNST, Robert M.: The Myth of Misspecification. Some 
Metaphors, Juni 1995. 
9516  VAN DER BURG, Brigitte, SIEGERS, Jacques, WINTER-
EBMER, Rudolf: Gender and Promotion in the Academic 
Labour Market. Juli 1995. 
9517  FALKINGER, Josef, FEHR, Ernst, GÄCHTER, Simon, 
WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: A simple mechanism for the 
efficient private provision of public goods - experimental 
evidence, August 1995, erscheint in: American Economic 
Review, 1999. 
9518  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Some Elements of a European 
Federal Union: A Public Choice Approach, September 1995. 
9519  BRUNNER, Johann, FALKINGER, Josef: Nonneutrality of 
taxes and subsidies for the private provision of public goods, 
September 1995. 
9520  WEISS, Christoph: Product Market Power and Dynamic 
Labour Demand, September 1995. 
9521  LANDESMANN, Michael, PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: 




9601  WEISS, Christoph: Exits From a Declining Sector: Eco-
nometric Evidence From a Panel of Upper-Austrian Farms 
1980-90., Jänner 1996.  
9602  BÖS, Dieter und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Private-public 
partnership: Gemeinschaftsunternehmen zwischen Privaten und 
der öffentlichen Hand, Februar 1996.  
9603  GÄCHTER, Simon, FEHR, Ernst, KMENT, Christiane: Does 
Social Exchange Increase Voluntary Cooperation?, Februar 
1996. 
9604  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef, BRUNNER, Johann: Heterogeneous 
consumers, vertical product differentiation and the rate of 
innovation, März 1996. 
9605  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: The Contributions of Werner W. 
Pommerehne to Public Choice, März 1996. 
9606  SEDJAV, Tsagaan-Uvgun: Wissenschaftlich-technologische 
Entwicklungsfragen der Mongolei, April 1996, Wis-
senschaftlicher Betreuer: o.Univ.-Prof. Dr. Helmut Schuster, 
B.Com. 
9607  KEUSCHNIGG, Christian u. KOHLER Wilhelm: 
    Innovation, Capital Accumulation and Economic 
    Transition, revised version April 1996. 
9608  AIGINGER, Karl: Beyond Trade Balances: the competitive 
race between the US, Japan and Europe, Juni 1996. 
9609  POMMEREHNE, Werner W., HART, Albert und 
SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Tragic Choices and Collective 
Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of Voter Preferences for 
Alternative Collective Decision-Making Mechanisms, Juli 
1996. 
9610  BARTEL, Rainer, POINTNER, Johannes, SCHNEIDER, 
Friedrich: Österreich im internationalen Wirschaftssystem, Juli 
1996, erschienen in: E.Nowotny und G. Winckler (Hg.), 
Grundzüge der Wirtschaftspolitik Österreichs, 2. Aufl., Manz-
Verlag, Wien 1997, S. 49-98. 
9611  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich, VOLKERT, Jürgen: Die Realisierung 
ökologisch-orientierter Wirtschaftspolitik - eine Unmöglichkeit? 
Überlegungen aus Sicht der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie, Juli 
1996. 
9612  AIGINGER, Karl, WEISS, Christoph R.: Does it Pay to be 
Flexible? Empirical Evidence on the Relation- ship between 
Labour Demand Flexibility and Profit Margins, Juli 1996. 
9613  WEISS, Christoph R.: Beneficial Concentration in a Menu Cost 
Model: A Note, August 1996. 
9614  GUSENLEITNER, Markus, WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf, 
ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: The Distribution of Earnings in 
Austria, 1972-1991, Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 3/98. 
9615 WINTER-EBMER,  Rudolf::  Benefit Duration and Un-
employment Entry: Quasi-Experimental Evidence for Austria, 
Oktober 1996. 
9616 WINTER-EBMER,  Rudolf::  Potential  Unemployment  Benefit 
Duration and Spell Length: Lessons from a Quasi-Experiment 
in Austria, in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60. 
1998,1, S. 33-45 
9617  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich, FREY, Bruno S.: Warum wird die 
Umweltökonomik kaum angewendet?, November 1996. 
9618  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Aktuelle Ergebnisse über die 
Schattenwirtschaft (Pfusch) in Österreich, November 1996. 
9619  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Die langfristige Entwicklung der 
Transformationsländer Osteuropas: Welche Rolle spielt die 
Integration der Märkte?, Dezember 1996. 
9620  BRUNNER, Johann K., PRINZ, Christopher, WIRTH, 
Friedrich: Die Zukunft der gesetzlichen Pensionsversicherung, 
Dezember 1996. 
9621  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich, GAWEL, Erik: Umsetzungsprobleme 
ökologisch orientierter Steuerpolitik: Eine polit-ökonomische 
Analyse, Dezember 1996. 
 
*** 
9701  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Hält der EURO, was er verspricht? 
Ökonomische Überlegungen zur Stabilität und zur Einführung 
des EURO, Jänner 1997. 
9702  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Welche Chancen hat Österreich als 
Wirtschaftsstandort im EU- und Globalisierungskontext derzeit 
und in Zukunft?, Jänner 1997. 
9703  BRUNNER, Johann K.: Ökonomische Analyse des um-
lagefinanzierten Pensionsversicherungssystems, Jänner 1997. 
9704  PFAFFERMAYR, Michael, WEISS, Christoph R.: On Market 
Power and Investment Behaviour, January 1997. 
9705  LANDESMANN, Michael A., STEHRER, Robert: Industrial 
Specialisation, Catching-up and Labour Market Dynamics, 
January 1997. 
9706  BARTEL, Rainer: Taking even introductory textbooks 
seriously. A note on the importance of a usual neglect, February 
1997. 
9707  KUNST, Robert M.: Decision bounds for data-admissible 
seasonal models, March 1997. 
9708  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf, ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Intra-firm 
Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance, Kyklos, 1999. 
9709  PRITZL, F. J. Rupert und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Korruption, 
März 1997. 
9710  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Empirical Results for the Size of the 
Shadow Economy of Western European Countries Over Time, 
März 1997.   30
9711  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und VOLKERT, Jürgen: No Chance 
for Incentive-orientated Environmental Policies in 
Representative Democracies? A Public Choice Approach, März 
1997. 
9712  FALKINGER, Josef: Wachstum, Verteilung und Be-
schäftigung, März 1997. 
9713  PRITZL, F. J. Rupert und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Zur 
Politischen Ökonomie autokratischer politischer Systeme - Ein 
theoretischer und empirischer Ansatz, April 1997. 
9714  SCHUSTER, Helmut: Das Phänomen der strukturellen 
Arbeitslosigkeit und Maßnahmen zu seiner Bekämpfung,, Mai 
1997. 
9715  BARTEL, Rainer: Paradigmatik versus Pragmatik in der 
(Umwelt-)Ökonomie. Eine epistemologische Sicht, Mai 1997.  
9716  BERGER, Helge und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Does the 
Bundesbank Yield in Conflicts? Frey and Schneider Revisited, 
Juni 1997. 
9717  RIESE, Martin und BRUNNER, Johann K.: Interpreting risk 
with demographic statistics, Juni 1997. 
9718  KUNST, Robert M.: Asymptotics for Unit-Root Processes with 
Underspecified Deterministic Structures, Juni 1997. 
9719  GAWEL, Erik und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Implementation 
Problems of Eco-Taxation: A Political-Economy Analysis, Juli 
1997 
9720  PRITZL, Rupert und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Political 
Economy of Autocratic Political Regimes: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Approach, Juli 1997 
 9721  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Unknown Wage Offer Dis-
tribution and Job Search Duration, Economics Letters, 1998. 
9722  BRUNNER, Johann K.: Optimal Taxation of Income and 
Bequests, August 1997 
9723  KEUSCHNIGG, Christian and KOHLER, Wilhelm: Eastern 
Enlargement of the EU: How Much is it Worth for Austria?, 
November 1997 
9724   HOFER, Helmut, KEUSCHNIGG, Christian und Wilhelm 
KOHLER,  A Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Model 
for the Austrian Economy With Special Emphasis on the 
Eastern EU Enlargement, November 1997. 
 
*** 
9801  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf und Klaus F. ZIMMERMANN:  
East-West Trade and Migration: The Austro-German Case, 
Jänner 1998, erscheint in: Jaime de Melo, Riccardo Faini und 
Klaus F. Zimmermann (eds.): Trade and Factor Mobility, 
Cambridge (CUP). 
9802   ICHINO, Andrea und Rudolf WINTER-EBMER: The Long-
Run Educational Cost of World War 2: An Application of 
Local Average Treatment Effect Estimation, Jänner 1998. 
9803  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Deregulierung und Privatisierung als 
Allheilmittel gegen ineffiziente Produktion von öffentlichen 
Unternehmen? Ein Erklärungsversuch mit Hilfe der 
ökonomischen Theorie der Politik, Jänner 1998. 
9804  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Märkte, Moral und Umwelt: Was sagt 
die Ökonomie dazu?, Jänner 1998. 
9805  LENK, Thomas, FUGE, Heidi und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: 
Zurück zu mehr Föderalismus: Ein Vorschlag zur 
Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs in der BRD unter be-
sonderer Berücksichtigung der ökonomischen Theorie der 
Politik, Jänner 1998. 
9806  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Stellt das starke Anwachsen der 
Schwarzarbeit eine wirtschaftspolitische Herausforderung dar? 
Einige Gedanken aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht, Jänner 1998.  
9807  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Einige grundlegende Elemente einer 
europäisch-föderalen Verfassung unter Zuhilfenahme der 
konstitutionellen ökonomischen Theorie, Jänner 1998. 
9808  LANDESMANN, Michael: Vertical produkt differentiation and 
international trade: an econometric analysis, März 1998. 
9808a BARTEL,  Rainer:  Öffentliche Finanzen, Finanzkontrolle und 
gesellschaftliche Wohlfarht. Volkwirtschaftliche Thesen, 
Antithesen und mögliche Synthesen, März 1998. Erschienen in 
überarbeiteter Version in: F. Klug (Hrsg.), Wesen und staats-
politische Funktion der öffentlichen Finanzkontrolle, Schrif-
tenreihe des Instituts für Kommunalwissenschaften an der 
Universität Linz, Bd. 107, S. 85-127. 
9809  AIGINGER, Karl und PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: 
    Product quality, cost asymmetry and the welfare loss of  
oligopoly, Februar 1998. 
9810  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Die Ost-Erweiterung der EU: Eine 
österreichische Perspektive, April 1998. 
9811  BERGER, Mathias und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Schat-
tenwirtschaft und Steuerhinterziehung: Ökonomische und 
psychologische Aspekte, April 1998. 
9812  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und STIEGLER, Harald: Controlling 
als effizienzsteigerndes Instrument der Universitätsführung – 
Zauber- oder Leerformel?, April 1998. 
9813  KUNST, Robert M.: Some aspects of modeling seasonality in 
economic time series, Juni 1998. 
9814  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Fifty Years Later: A New Marshall Plan 
for Eastern Europe?, Juli 1998. 
9815  RAPHAEL, Steven und WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: 
Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, September 
1998. 
9816  ICHINO, Andrea und WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Lower and 
Upper Bounds of Returns to Schooling: An Exercise in IV 
Estimation with Different Instruments, September 1998, 
erscheint in: European Economic Review, 1999. 
9817  PÖLL, Günther und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Schatten-
wirtschaft, Juli 1998. 
9818  BRUNNER, Johann K.: Kapitaldeckungsverfahren versus 
Umlageverfahren: Grundsätzliches zur Systemdiskussion, 
August 1998.  
9819  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und ENSTE, Dominik: Increasing 
Shadow Economies all over the world - Fiction or Reality? A 
Survey of the Global Evidence of its Size and of its Impact from 
1970 to 1995, November 1998. 
9820  LENK, Thomas und SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Zurück zu mehr 
Föderalismus: Ein Vorschlag zur Neugestaltung des 
Finanzausgleichs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der neuen Bundesländer, 
November 1998. 
9821  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Die Bedeutung der EU-Osterweiterung 
für verschiedene Sektoren der österreichichen Wirtschaft, 
November 1998. 
9822  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Die pan-europäische Integration: 
Herausforderungen für die Wirtschaftswissenschaft, November 
1998. 
9823  ATKINSON, Anthony B.: The Changing Distribution of 
Income: Evidence and Explanations (1. K.W. Rothschild 
Vorlesung), November 1998. 
9824  PECH, Susanne und PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: Strategic 
Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Involuntary 
Unemployment and Endogenous Location Choice, November 
1998. 
9825  BARTEL, Rainer: Reform und Öffnung Osteuropas, November 
1998. 
9826  ÖTSCH, Walter: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft von 
Grundkategorien des ökonomischen Denkens: Raum, Zeit, 
Objekt und Ich, November 1998. 
9827  ÖTSCH, Walter: „Äußere“ und „Innere“ Glücksmodelle in der 
Theoriegeschichte der Ökonomie, November 1998, erscheint in: 
Zinn, Bellebaum und Schaaf: Ökonomie und Glück, Frühjahr 
1999. 
9828  ÖTSCH, Walter: Konstruktivismus und ökonomische Theorie, 
November 1999, erscheint in: Lehmann und Pillath: Handbuch 
der Evolutorischen Ökonomik, Springer Verlag, 1999. 
 
*** 
9901  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf and ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef: Firm 
Size Wage Differentials in Switzerland: Evidence from Job 
Changers, Jänner 1999, erscheint in: American Economic 
Review, Papers & Proceedings, 1999. 
9902  BRANDSTÄTTER, Eduard, KÜHBERGER, Anton und 
SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: "Surprise in Decision making under 
Uncertainty, Jänner 1999.   31
9903  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und WAGNER, Alexander: "The 
Role of International Monetary Institutions after the EMU and 
after the Asian Crises: Some Preliminary Ideas Using 
Constitutional Economics", Februar 1999 
9904  BRUNNER, Johann K.: Transfers zwischen den Generationen, 
Februar 1999. 
9905  LACKÓ, Mária: Hidden Economy – An Unknown Quantity? 
Comparative Analysis of Hidden Economies in Transition 
Countries in 1989-1995, Februar 1999 
9906  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Trade and Wages: What Can Factor 
Contents Tell Us? Februar 1999. 
9907  LANDESMANN, Michael und STEHRER Robert: The 
European Unemployment Problem: A Structural Approach, 
März 1999. 
9908  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Das Verhältnis von Innovation und 
Beschäftigung aus wirtschaftlicher Sicht – Jobkiller oder 
Jobwunder?, Mai 1999. 
9909  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und LENK, Thomas: Zurück zum 
Trennsystem als Königsweg zu mehr Föderalismus in Zeiten 
des „Aufbau Ost“, Juni 1999. 
9910  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Die Entwicklung der Sozialpolitik in 
repräsentativen und in direkten Demokratien: Königsweg oder 
Sackgasse? Einige Bemerkungen aus der „Public Choice“-
Perspektive, Juni 1999. 
9911  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Ist Schwarzarbeit ein Volkssport 
geworden? Ein internationaler Vergleich des Ausmaßes der 
Schwarzarbeit von 1970 bis 1997, Juni 1999. 
9912  FELBERMAYR, Gabriel, und KOHLER, Wilhelm: Zur 
ökonomischen Logik spekulativer Attacken, Juli 1999. 
9913  FERSTERER, Josef und WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Returns 
to Education - Evidence for Austria, August 1999. 
9914  BARTEL, Rainer: Social economic issues in sexual orientation 
– Where do we stand?, September 1999. 
9915  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und ENSTE, Dominik: Shadow 
Economies: Sizes, Causes, and Consequences, September 1999. 
9916  BARTEL, Rainer: Ökonomische Rationalität im System der 
öffentlichen Finanzkontrolle. Die Funktionalität des neuen Oö. 
Landesrechnungshofs. September 1999. 
9917  FERSTERER, Josef  und Rudolf  WINTER-EBMER: Are 
Austrian Returns to Education Falling Over Time?, Oktober 
1999. 
9918  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und WINNER, Hannes: Ein 
Vorschlag zur Reform der österreichischen 
Unternehmensbesteuerung, November 1999. 
9919  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Induzieren ökologische 
Steuerreformen einen Lenkungseffekt oder nur volle 
Staatskassen? Einige volkswirtschaftliche Überlegungen, 
November 1999. 
9920  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Wer gewinnt, wer verliert durch die 
Osterweiterung der EU?, November 1999. 
9921  DRÈZE, Jacques: On the Macroeconomics of Uncertainty and 
Incomplete Markets, November 1999. 
9922  STIGLBAUER, Alfred M. und WEISS, Christoph R.: Family 
and Non-Family Succession in the Upper-Austrian Farm 
Sector, Dezember 1999. 
9923  HOLZLEITNER, Christian: Linear Profit-Sharing in 
Regulatory Contracts, Dezember 1999. 
9924  ÖTSCH, Walter: Objekt, Subjekt und Wert. Zur 





0001  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Die Osterweiterung der EU aus der Sicht 
bestehender Mitgliedsländer: Was lehrt uns die Theorie der 
ökonomischen Integration?, Jänner 2000. 
0002  FERSTERER, Josef und WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: 
Smoking, Discount Rates, and Returns to Education, Jänner 
2000.  
0003  BARTEL, Rainer: Quo vadimus. Grundgedanken zum 
Verhältnis von Wirtschaft, Staat und Gesellschaft, Februar 
2000. 
0004  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und FREY, Bruno S.: Informal and 
Underground Economy, Februar 2000. 
0005  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und FELD, Lars P.: State and Local 
Taxation, Februar 2000. 
0006  ZWEIMÜLLER, Josef und WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Firm-
specific Training - Consequences for Job Mobility, März 2000. 
0007  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Schattenwirtschaft – Tatbestand, 
Ursachen, Auswirkungen, April 2000 
0008  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: The Increase of the Size of the 
Shadow Economy of 18 OECD Countries: Some Preliminary 
Explanations, April 2000. 
0009  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und AHLHEIM, Michael: Allowing 
for Household Preferences in Emission Trading – A 
Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate, Mai 2000 
0010  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Illegal Activities, but still value 
added ones (?): Size, Causes, and Measurement of the 
Shadow Economies all over the World, Mai 2000. 
0011  WEICHSELBAUMER, Doris: Is it Sex or Personality? 
The Impact of Sex-Stereotypes on Discrimination in 
Applicant Selection, Mai 2000. 
0012    FELBERMAYR, Gabriel, und KOHLER, Wilhelm: 
Effizienz- und Verteilungswirkungen der 
Handelsliberalisierung, Juni 2000. 
0013  EGGER, Peter und PFAFFERMAYR, Michael: Trade, 
Multinational Sales, and FDI in a Three-Factors Model, 
Juni 2000. 
0014  LANDESMANN, Michael und STEHRER, Robert: 
Potential Switchovers in Comparative Advantage: 
Patterns of Industrial Convergence, Juni 2000. 
0015  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und WAGNER, Alexander: 
Korporatismus im europäischen Vergleich: Förderung 
makroökonomischer Rahmenbedingungen?, Juli 2000. 
0016  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich und LENK, Thomas: Grundzüge 
der föderalen Finanzverfassung aus ökonomischer 
Perspektive: Trennsystem vs. Verbundsystem, Juli 2000. 
0017  HOLZLEITNER, Christian: Efficient Cost Passthrough, 
August 2000. 
0018  HOLZLEITNER, Christian: Evolution of Regulatory 
Contracts in the Real World - A Change for Good?, 
August 2000. 
0019  KOHLER, Wilhelm: International Fragmentation: A 
Policy Perspective, August 2000. 
0020  KOHLER, Wilhelm: A Specific-Factors View on 
Outsourcing, August 2000. 
0021  WEICHSELBAUMER, Doris: Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination in Hiring, September 2000. 
0022  KOHLER; Wilhelm: Internationale Migration: 
Anmerkungen aus der Sicht der Außenwirtschaftstheorie, 
Oktober 2000. 
0023  AIGINGER, Karl und DAVIES, S.W.: Industrial 
Specialisation and geographic Concentration: Two sides 
of the same coin? Not for the European Union, Oktober 
2000. 
0024  EGGER, Hartmut und EGGER, Peter: Outsourcing and 
Skill-Specific Employment in a Small Economy: Austria 
and the Fall of the Iron Curtain,  Oktober 2000. 
0025  KOHLER, Wilhelm: An Incumbent Country View on 
Eastern Enlargement of the EU - Part I: A Gerneral 
Treatment, November 2000. 
0026  KOHLER, Wilhelm: An Incumbent Country View on 
Eastern Enlargement of the EU - Part II: The Austrian 
Case, November 2000. 
0027  FREY, Bruno S.: What are the sources of happiness?, 
November 2000 
0028  RIESE, Martin: Weakening the SALANT-condition for 
the Comparison of mean durations, Dezember 2000 
0029  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: Long-term consequences of 
an innovative redundancy-retraining project: The Austrian 
Steel Foundation, Dezember 2000.   32
0030  BRUNNER, Johann K. und PECH, Susanne: Adverse 
Selection in the annuity market when payoffs vary over 
the time of retirement, Dezember 2000. 
 
*** 
   
0101  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Osterweiterung der EU: Die 
Mitgliedschaft wird teurer – Wird sie auch wertvoller?, 
Jänner 2001. 
0102  STEHRER, Robert: Industrial specialisation, trade, and 
labour market dynamics in a multisectoral model of 
technological progress, Jänner 2001. 
0103  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich; SALHOFER, Klaus; SCHMID, 
Erwin, und STREICHER, Gerhard: Was the Austrian 
Agricultural Policy Least Cost Efficient?, März 2001. 
0104  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich; KIRCHLER, Erich und 
MACIEJOVSKY, Boris: Social Representations on Tax 
Avoidance, Tax Evasion, and Tax Flight: Do Legal 
Differences Matter?, März 2001. 
0105  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich; PITLIK, Hans, und 
STROTMANN, Harald: On the Politicization of 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Germany after 
Unification, März 2001. 
0106  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich: Privatisierung und 
Deregulierung in Österreich in den 90er Jahren: Einige 
Anmerkungen aus Sicht der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie, 
März 2001. 
0107  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich; BRAITHWAITE, Valerie, and 
REINHART, Monika: Individual Behavior in the Cash / 
Shadow Economy in Australia: Facts, Empirical Findings 
and some Mysteries, März 2001. 
0108  BRUNELLO, Giorgio; LUCIFORA, Claudio, und 
WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: The Wage Expectations of 
European College Students, März 2001. 
0109  BRUNNER, Johann K. und PECH, Susanne: Die Dritte 
Säule der Altersvorsorge - Sparen und Versichern?, Juni 
2001. 
0110  STÖGER, Klaus und WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: 
Lehrlingsausbildung in Österreich: Welche Betriebe 
bilden Lehrlinge aus? Juli 2001. 
0111  HEIJDRA, Ben J.; KEUSCHNIGG, Christian, und 
KOHLER, Wilhelm: Eastern Enlargement of the EU: 
Jobs, Investment and Welfare in Present Member 
Countries, Oktober 2001 
0112  BRUNNER, Johann und BUCHEGGER, Reiner: 
Gesundheitsgüter und Gesundheitsdienstleistungen in 
Österreich, Dezember 2001. 
0113  MALINVAUD, Edmond: On methodolgy in 
macroeconomics – with application to the demand for 
unskilled labour, November 2001. 
 
*** 
0201  KOHLER, Wilhelm: The Distributional Effects of 
International Fragmentation, April 2002. 
0202  WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf and WIRZ, Aniela: Public 
Funding and Enrolment into Higher Education in Europe, 
April 2002. 
0203  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Issues of US-EU Trade Policy, May 
2002. 
0204  BRUNNER, Johann K. und PECH, Susanne: Adverse 
selection in the annuity market with sequential and 
simultaneous insurance demand, May 2002. 
0205  Stiglbauer, Alfred, Stahl, Florian, Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf 
and Josef Zweimüller: Job Creation and Job Destruction 
in a Regulated Labor Market: The Case of Austria, July 
2002. 
0206  René Böheim and Mark P Taylor: Job search methods, 
intensity and success in Britain in the 1990s, July 2002. 
0207  BURGSTALLER, Johann: Are stock returns a leading 
indicator for real macroeconomic developments?, July 
2002. 
0208  KOHLER, Wilhelm: Aspects of International 
Fragmentation, August 2002. 
0209  PECH Susanne: Tax incentives for private life annuities 
and the social security reform: effects on consumption and 
on adverse selection, August 2002. 
0210  BRUNELLO, Giorgio and WINTER-EBMER, Rudolf: 
Why Do Students Expect to Stay Longer in College? 
Evidence from Europe, August 2002. 
0211  RIESE, Martin: A New Class of Ageing Distributions, 
December 2002. 
0212  BRUNNER, Johann K.: Welfare Effects of Pension 




0301  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich and BAJADA, Christopher: The 
Size and Development of the Shadow Economies in the 
Asia-Pacific, April 2003. 
0302  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich, CHAUDHURI, Kausik and 
CHATTERJEE, Sumana: The Size and Development of 
the Indian Shadow Economy and a Comparison with other 
18 Asian Countries: An Empirical Investigation, April 
2003. 
0303  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich, WAGNER, Alexander F. and 
DUFOUR, Mathias: Satisfaction not guaranteed - 
Institutions and sastisfaction with democracy in Western 
Europe, April 2003. 
0304  SCHNEIDER, Friedrich and WAGNER; Alexander, F.: 
Tradeable permits - Ten key design issues, April 2003. 
 
 
 